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Should a brandedpharmaceuticalcompany be allowed to pay a generic competitor to stay out of the market for a drug? Antitrust policy
implies that such a deal should be prohibited, but the answer becomes
less clear when the transaction is packaged as a patent-litigation settlement. Since Congresspassed the Hatch-Waxman Act, which encourages
generic manufacturers to challenge pharmaceuticalpatent validity, settlements of this kind have been on the rise. Congress, the Departmentof
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission have condemned these
agreements as anticompetitive and costly to American consumers, but
none of these bodies has been able to craft a regulatorysolution. Several
circuit courts have recently heard challenges to these settlements under
existing antitrust law, but they have all adopted different approachesto
balancing the drug patent holder's right to settle litigation against the
pro-competitive policies enshrined in the antitruststatutes.
Drawing on the tools of comparative institutionalanalysis, this Note
questions the wisdom of the single-branch regulatory reforms that have
been proposed thus far and it advocates a return to common-sense administrative regulationfor this technically complex legal problem. This
Note callsfor (1) Congress to begin the regulatory effort by articulating
its policy goals, (2) the FTC to promulgate rules, including safe harbors,
that further Congress's policies, and (3) courts to use both Congress's
University of Virginia School of Law, J.D. 2011; Columbia University, M.A. 2007;
Harvard College, A.B. 2006. An earlier version of this Note was selected as the winner of the
2010 Virginia State Bar IP Section Student Writing Competition. I would like to thank Professor
Margo Bagley, from whose seminar this Note arose, for her dedicated instruction and invaluable
guidance during my time at Virginia Law. Thanks also to Professors John Duffy, John Harrison,
Liz Magill, and Sai Prakash for the many stimulating classroom discussions that influenced this
Note, as well as my parents for their unwavering support. All errors remain my own.
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pronouncements and the FTC's regulations as a basis for ultimately
evaluating settlement agreements. By respecting institutional competencies, regulators can overcome the current political hurdles and bring
clarity to this ambiguous nexus between patent and antitrustlaw.
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INTRODUCTION

In January of 1997, Bayer paid Barr Laboratories nearly $400 million for Barr's promise to refrain from producing ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride ("Cipro"), an antibiotic, until December 2003. Consumer
advocates and purchasers of Cipro promptly filed suits against Bayer and
Barr, alleging that this agreement was an illegal contract in restraint of
trade.' At first blush, this case appears open-and-shut: the parties executed a market-sharing agreement in contravention of Section I of the
Sherman Act.2 Yet, a federal district court and two courts of appeals concluded that this agreement was valid.3
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Ciprofloxacin II), 363
I.
F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd in part
sub nom. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
2.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
3.
See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (Ark. Carpenters 1), 604
F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'g in part Ciprofloxacin II, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y.
2005), reh'g en banc denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606
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The agreement between the companies was not the corrupt, backof-the-limo sort of deal that the Sherman Act originally sought to curtail; rather, it was the settlement of a patent-infringement suit that
Bayer launched pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("Hatch-Waxman Act"). 4 While
courts generally encourage settlement,5 these settlements in which a
patent holder pays a potential challenger to drop its claims of patent
invalidity-so-called reverse-payment settlements-are peculiar because the plaintiff in the original action is paying the defendant to end
the suit.6 These settlements prompt a number of questions: is the patent
holder paying off the competition to maintain its monopoly profits on a
patent that the holder knows to be invalid?7 Does the litigation reflect a
legitimate patent dispute, or is it simply a sham to cover an otherwise
blatant violation of antitrust laws? And finally, at the most fundamental
level, is the purpose of the settlement to avoid litigation costs or to stifle
competition?
In recent years, pharmaceutical reverse-payment settlements have
drawn the ire of many political-action groups and commentators. Some
have attacked them as anticompetitive,' costly to American consumers,
and even a $35 billion drain on the United States' health-insurance system.0 The House of Representatives," the Senate, 2 the Federal Trade
(2011); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.) (Ciprofloxacin1ff), 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'g in part
363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Ciprofloxacin1I, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.
4.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
5.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931)
("Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by
agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act.").
6.
For a brief description of this problem, see Steven Seidenberg, The Flip Side of
'Reverse Payments,' A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 17, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/the flipside of reverse-payments.
7.
For a simplified analysis of how reverse-payment settlements may be profitable for
both the innovator and generic manufacturer, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,

1588-96 (2006).
8.

Editorial, Pay-for-Delay: Health-Care Reform Should End This Scheme by Drug-

makers, WASH. PosT, Jan. 15, 2010, at A24 ("It is difficult to see how this practice is anything
but a sham and anticompetitive.").
9.
See Natasha Singer, Deals to Restrain Generic Drugs Face a Ban in Health Care
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at B4.

Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the
10.
Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution), Address at the
Center for American Progress (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
I1.
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111 th Cong. (2009).
12.
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Commission ("FTC")," and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")14
have all commented on or taken action to eradicate this practice, and
they have had the support of the majority of state attorneys general" and
the American Medical Association. Yet, none of these reform efforts
have gained traction. The problem has fallen squarely on the courts, and
they have divided sharply over the proper legal standard to adopt in
evaluating reverse-payment settlement agreements. 17
Many scholars have offered solutions. For instance, some have examined whether it would be wise for Congress to enact a per se rule
banning these payments," and some proposals suggest adopting a presumption of illegality' or quick-look analysis 20 instead. At least one
commentator has suggested a larger role for agencies, premising his argument on the FTC's superior position "to collect and synthesize
aggregate information, relative to courts."2' Still others have suggested
that reform take place in the judiciary. These scholars argue for standards
13.
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S.
919 (2006) (No. 05-273).
14.
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, Ark. Carpenters 1,
604 F.3d 98 (No. 05-2851-cv(L)).
15.
Brief of 34 State Attorneys General as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc Filed by Appellants Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. et al.,
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (Ark. Carpenters II), 625 F.3d 779 (2d
Cir.), denying reh'g en banc to 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)), available at
http://www.prescriptionaccess.org/docs/Cipro_2010_MayAG -Amicus.pdf.
16.
Brief of Amici Curiae AARP et al. Supporting Appellants' Petition for En Banc
Review, Ark. Carpenters II, 625 F.3d 779 (No.

05-2851-cv(L)), available at http://

www.fdalawblog.net/files/cipro---aarpama.pdf.
17.
Compare Ciprofloxacin 111, 544 F.3d 1323 (conducting antitrust analysis in light of
patent scope), Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d
187 (2d Cir. 2006) (conducting antitrust analysis in light of patent scope), and ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (looking to exclusionary scope of patent
to examine alleged antitrust violations), with La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reverse-payment settlements per se illegal).
18.
See, e.g., Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent
Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, in ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOmics 475, 479-80 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004); Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute
Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-PharmaceuticalCompanies?, 86 TEx. L. REV. 647 (2008)

(arguing against an absolute ban on reverse-payment settlements but not developing alternative proposals).
19.
See Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1561 (suggesting that courts should accord a presumption of illegality to a settlement "if the settlement both restricts the generic firm's ability
to market a competing drug and includes compensation from the innovator the generic firm").
20.
See Yuki Onoe, Comment, "Pay for Delay" Settlements in PharmaceuticalLitigation: Drawing a Fine Line Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 528, 549-551 (2010).
21.
See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 670-83 (2009) (setting

forth a novel approach to analyzing settlements that supports a larger role for the FTC).
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ranging from a per se rule,22 to some form of a rule-of-reason analysis,23
to a simple sham standard that allows all such settlements "unless a neutral observer would reasonably think either that the patent was almost
certain to be declared invalid, or the defendants were almost certain to be
found not to have infringed it." 24
Yet, virtually none of this commentary steps back and asks which
branch is best suited to solve the problem of reverse-payment settlements; it merely addresses what changes a particular branch should
make to its own rules.25 This approach overlooks the teachings of comparative institutional choice analysis. 26 This trend in legal scholarship
began with The Legal Process, a seminal set of unpublished course notes
developed by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks at the Harvard
Law School in the 1950s." Professors Hart and Sacks sought to shift the

See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Pre22.
sumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 67 (2009) (setting out five criteria that, if met,

should trigger courts to apply a per se rule of illegality).
See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes
23.
Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491 (2002) (arguing that courts should favor the rule of

reason or quick look analysis for reverse-payment settlement cases instead of per se illegality);
Jeff Thomas, Note, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse Payments in the
Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 45-46 (2007) (approving the rule of
reason analysis applied by the courts in In re Tamoxifen and Schering-Plough).
See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceuti24.
cal PatentSettlements: The Needfor Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J.

617, 632 (2005) (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993
(N.D. Ill. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Christopher M. Holman, Do
Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 585 (2007) (arguing that courts should make "explicit assessment[s] of
third party generic entry" in evaluating reverse-payment settlements).
Professor Hemphill's recent article begins to address this question by advocating an
25.
expanded role for the FTC vis-Ai-vis the courts in regulating reverse-payment settlements,
primarily due to the FTC's superior ability to gather and synthesize market information. See
Hemphill, supra note 21, at 670-88. He does not, however, address which institutions should
set the policies that are enforced. He also explicitly limits his comparative analysis to determining which branch is best suited to implement his suggested regulatory approach. Id. at 673
("There is of course an enormous literature on the choice of courts versus agencies, adjudication versus rulemaking, and rules versus standards, and this Article does not engage the full
complexity of those debates. My goal here is simply to suggest how the virtues of an aggregate perspective on settlement practice shift the balance in away that favors agency
rulemaking.").
26.
For representative applications of comparative institutional choice analysis, see
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of IntermediaryLiabilityfor Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2001);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economic Analysis of Law: Institutional Choice and Political Faith,
22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 959 (1997); and Cassandra Burke Robertson, TransnationalLitigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (20 10).
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB27.
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
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paradigm from analyzing the virtues of individual rules to studying the
structure of institutions. 28 They premised their analytical framework on
the observation that "[t]he structure of official institutions is immensely
significant in shaping the general character and direction of private activity, since it determines both the permissible range of private decision and
the conditions under which the decisions are made."29 At its heart, Professors Hart and Sacks' theory "holds that law should allocate
decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be
respected by other actors in the system, even if those actors would have
reached a different conclusion."o Although Professors Hart and Sachs expounded these ideas over fifty years ago, scholars associated with the law
and economics movement have recently picked up the torch of comparative institutional choice."
This Note will contend that comparative institutional choice has particular utility in designing reverse-payment settlement regulation. Part I
discusses pharmaceutical patent holders' motives for engaging in reverse-payment settlements. The Part begins with an overview of the
Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime, and it proceeds to discuss how this
framework affects settlement structures. Part H then explains the many
approaches that have been used to regulate settlements so far. It begins
by looking at the different analyses used by courts, and it then briefly
surveys the positions of the political branches. Finally, Part III uses the
tools of comparative institutional analysis to determine the most appropriate forum for each step of the reverse-payment settlement regulatory
process. It contends that institutional resources will be maximized if
Congress first articulates its policy goals for reverse-payment settlement
regulation; the FTC then promulgates rules that further Congress's explicit goals; and the courts use both Congress's pronouncements and the
FTC's regulations as a basis to evaluate individual settlements. The Note
concludes by providing an example of a reform that follows this institutional structure to efficiently regulate reverse-payment settlements.
Comparative institutional choice cannot, however, tell us which
combination of legal rules will most efficiently sort pro-competitive settlement agreements from anticompetitive deals. It is therefore important
to highlight what this Note does not seek to accomplish. It does not pureds., 1994). William Eskridge and Philip Frickey compiled and published the 1958 "prelimi-

nary draft" of Hart and Sacks' work in 1994.
See Ernest A. Young, InstitutionalSettlement in a Globalizing JudicialSystem, 54
28.
DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2005).
29.
HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 9.
Young, supra note 28, at I149-50.
30.
See supra note 26.
31.

PharmaceuticalPatent Litigation Settlements
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port to tell Congress, antitrust authorities, or courts which of the competing regulatory approaches to adopt. Rather, it calls attention to
governmental institutions' failure to address reverse-payment settlements
using the traditional procedures of the administrative state. While such a
structure leaves this Note exposed to the charge that it merely seeks to
tear down fully formed regulatory structures without offering a solution
of its own, this is neither its thesis nor my intent. This Note is instead an
exposition on how not to regulate reverse-payment settlements. It contends that the problems that these agreements have caused are no
different from many others that have been encountered in the history of
the administrative state, and it concludes that they should be solved using the traditional combination of legislation, agency rulemaking, and
judicial gap-filling to most effectively utilize each branch's expertise. Put
simply, comparative institutional analysis counsels against the current
proposals for unilateral action by any one of these actors.

I. THE

REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENT PROBLEM

Legal scholars have consistently touted the patent system as the sine
qua non of new drug development,3 2 and indeed, the economic picture
suggests that this may not be an exaggeration. The reason for the patent
system's primacy rests in research and development costs: drug development is notoriously expensive." Studies have placed the costs of
developing a new chemical entity between $802 million4 and $3.911
billion.5 One study concluded that, absent patent protection, sixty-five
percent of pharmaceutical inventions would not have been commercially

32.

See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentabil-

ity, 87 TEx. L. REV. 503, 504 (2009) (citing JAMES BESSEN &
FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
(2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
ABOUT IT 39-41 (2004)).

33.

MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 88-89
ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do

See Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of PharmaceuticalInnovation, 8 NA959, 959 (2009) (discussing costs associated with drug

TURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY
development).

34.
See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003). But see MERRILL GOOZNER, THE
$800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEw DRUGS 239, 245-46 (2005)
(citing studies by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen/Congress Watch and the Global Alliance for
TB Drug Development that place the cost of drug discovery at $71 million and $115-$240
million respectively, if non-R&D costs are excluded from the calculation).

35.

See Munos, supra note 33, at 962-64.
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introduced and sixty percent of pharmaceutical inventions would not
have been developed.

The importance of pharmaceutical patents is due to the low costs of
appropriation of the knowledge that goes into drug development. While
the research and development costs faced by an innovator pharmaceutical company are staggering, it takes little more than an undergraduate
chemistry degree and access to basic lab equipment to copy most drugs.
Moreover, the cost of manufacturing copies can be quite low; one study
found that the average ratio of price to marginal cost for branded pharmaceuticals is over six to one, suggesting that production costs are very
low for most drugs." The relatively low costs of both reverse engineering
and copying imply that, absent patent protection, pharmaceutical innovators would have no way to recover their research and development costs.
Yet, even the patent system does not always allow an innovator to
recover its development costs. Very cheap generic competition and government cost-control measures, such as mandatory-generic-substitution
laws, 9 make it nearly impossible for a drug developer to continue recovering its research costs after a drug's patent expires. To alleviate these
problems and encourage such uncertain research, Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.40
A. The Hatch- Waxman Act

The Hatch-Waxman Act represents "compromises reached in negotiations between the brand name drug industry and the generic drug
See Edwin Mansfield, Parents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. ScI.
36.
173, 175 (1986).
For information on the syntheses of several drugs, see generally E.J. COREY, BAR37.
BARA CZAK6 & LASZLO KORTI, MOLECULES AND MEDICINE (2007) (discussing chemical
structures of several drugs); K.C. NICOLAOU & SCOTT A. SNYDER, CLASSICS IN TOTAL SYNTHESIS 11 (2003) (describing, in detail, syntheses of several natural products with therapeutic
properties); K.C. NICOLAOU & ERIK J. SORENSEN, CLASSICS IN TOTAL SYNTHESIS: TARGETS,
STRATEGIES, METHODS (1996) (same). In fall 2007, the author was an instructor for an undergraduate laboratory course at Harvard University that replicated a synthesis of oseltamivir
phosphate (Tamiflu), a therapeutic for Avian influenza (H5NI), among other influenza strains.
A junior undergraduate followed a protocol that had recently been published by the course's
host laboratory and obtained a very respectable 2.1% yield over a ten-step synthesis. See YingYeung Yeung, Sungwoo Hong & E.J. Corey, A Short Enantioselective Pathwayfor the Synthesis of the Anti-Influenza Neuramidase Inhibitor Oseltamivirfrom 1,3-Butadiene and Acrylic
Acid, 128 J. AM. CHEMICAL Soc'Y 6310 (2006) (describing synthetic pathway).
James W. Hughes, Michael J. Moore & Edward A. Snyder, "Napsterizing Pharma38.
ceuticals": Access, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9229, 2002).
See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM'N, DRUG PRODUCT SELEC39.
TION 141-55 (1979) (describing state regulation of pharmaceuticals).
40.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35 U.S.C.).
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industry" 41 to "assure[] consumers of more low-cost generic drugs when a
valid patent expires and the drug industry of sufficient incentive to develop
innovative pharmaceutical therapies."42 A number of problems in the
pharmaceutical sector during the 1970s and early 1980s precipitated these
compromises. First, after Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act in 1962," the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") required all new drug applicants-both
pioneer and generic-to make a showing of safety and efficacy. In practice, this meant that generic applicants had to "virtually duplicate the same
health and safety tests conducted by the original applicant."" Rather than
incur this expense, generic manufacturers frequently opted to stay out of
the market.45 Second, as FDA review became more rigorous under the Kefauver-Harris Amendments' efficacy requirements, the period of market
exclusivity that a pharmaceutical patent holder enjoyed decreased because
pre-market clinical trials consumed at least part of the patent period.46
The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to alleviate these problems by both
encouraging generic entry and restoring the market value of pharmaceutical patents. Congress intended the Act's pro-innovation measures, at
their most fundamental level, to enhance market-control periods for truly
novel drugs. First, Congress included a pharmaceutical patent term extension to account for the regulatory delay caused by FDA review of a
new drug application.47 The provision allows extensions of market exclusivity of up to five years,48 calculated as half of the regulatory review
period less any time during which the applicant did not act with due diligence in seeking approval.49 Only one patent may be extended per
regulatory review period for a product,so and the total term of the extended patent may not exceed fourteen years from the date of regulatory
approval."' Second, the Act provided for data-exclusivity periods for both
52
new chemical entities and new uses for approved drugs.53 During such a
41.
130 CONG. REC. H24425 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman).
42.
Id.
43.
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
44.
H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688.
45.
Id.
46.
See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development in the United Statesfrom 1963
to 1999, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 286, 289 (2001).
47.
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
48.
Id. § 156(g)(6)(A).
49.
Id. §I 156(c)(I)-(2). The regulatory review period for new drugs is defined at
§ 156(g)(1)(B).
50.
Id. § 156(c)(4).

51.
52.
53.

Id. § 156(c)(3).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii).
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data exclusivity period, generic manufacturers may not rely on the first
applicant's safety and efficacy data. A generic pharmaceutical company
is free, however, to submit-and, absent other forms of protection,4 the
FDA may approve-an application for the same chemical entity or new
use that relies on clinical trial data that the generic manufacturer generated itself. The need to generate clinical trial data substantially raises the
barrier to entry for a generic form of the drug."
On the pro-competition side, the Hatch-Waxman Act created the Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"), a mechanism that allows
generic drug manufacturers to seek FDA approval by showing bioequivalence to an approved drug, thus piggybacking on the first applicant's
safety and efficacy data. An ANDA must certify that the generic manufacturer will market the new drug for the same applications as the
approved drug and will label it in the same manner as the approved drug.
The ANDA must also certify that the new drug is bioequivalent to the
approved drug.16 Generally-and subject to the patent-related provisions
discussed below-the Hatch-Waxman Act requires the FDA to approve
the generic's ANDA if the applicant can make these showings. 57
Significantly, when a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it must
submit one of four certifications regarding the patent status of the pioneer drug: the drug is not covered by a patent ("Paragraph I"); the patent
has expired ("Paragraph II"); the generic manufacturer will not market
its drug until the pioneer drug's patent has expired ("Paragraph III"); or
the pioneer drug's "patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug" ("Paragraph IV").'s Because
patent protection is not an issue for drugs under the first two certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not provide any sort of patent-linked
data exclusivity for them. If an ANDA includes a Paragraph I or Paragraph II certification, the FDA may approve the ANDA at any time. 9 If
an ANDA includes a Paragraph III certification, the FDA is prohibited
from approving it until the patent expiresf 0

Other forms of exclusivity might include patent protection or market exclusivity.
54.
55.
For more on these data exclusivity periods, which are beyond the scope of the reverse-payment settlement problem discussed in this Note, see Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing
Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Lw, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 49394 (2004).
56.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
See id. §355(j)(4).
57.
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
58.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
59.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
60.
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Finally, if a generic manufacturer files a Paragraph IV certification,
it has committed an "artificial" act of patent infringement.6 ' The patent
holder then has forty-five days from the time it receives notice of the
Paragraph IV filing to initiate an infringement action. 62 If the patent
holder does so, the FDA must stay approval of the ANDA until the earliest of thirty months from the date of notice of the filing, the date on
which a district court finds the patent infringed, or the date the district
court enters a settlement order or consent decree stating that the patent is
invalid or not infringed. If, however, a court finds that the patent is valid
and infringed by the generic, the ANDA will be approved no earlier than
the expiration date of the patent.6 Congress intended this automatic
thirty-month stay of ANDA approval to give "further assurance to the
brand-name drug manufacturers that the generic drug manufacturer
would not put his [drug] on [the] market until [the] court decision came
through."65
To encourage generic manufacturers to use the ANDA system to
challenge weak patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act also granted the first
generic manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV certification a 180-day market-exclusivity period." During this period, the FDA will not approve a
subsequent ANDA application, thus ensuring that the first ANDA filer
will be able to capture some supra-competitive rents in a temporary duopoly with the original manufacturer. This exclusivity period is only
available once, and the first ANDA applicant may forfeit the exclusivity
if it fails to market the drug 7 or, significantly, enters into an agreement
with the patent owner that is found to violate the antitrust laws.68
The Hatch-Waxman Act thus set up a careful balance of incentives
for innovators and generic manufacturers. On the one hand, the Act gives
generic manufacturers the ability to file ANDAs, which can rely on the
safety and efficacy data submitted by the innovator, and a 180-day market-exclusivity incentive to challenge weak patents. On the other hand,
the Act provides innovators with a patent term extension, a non-patent
data-exclusivity period for new drugs, and an automatic thirty-month
stay of generic approval to settle patent-validity disputes.

61.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 676 (1990).
62.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
63.
Id.
64.
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(Il)(bb); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
65.
131 CONG. REC. H24427 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman).
66.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
67.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
68.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
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These statutory incentives have proven rife for manipulation. The
potential generic market-exclusivity period, coupled with the statutoryinfringement provision for Paragraph IV filings, has motivated generic
manufacturers to challenge many valuable pharmaceutical patents. While
the patent holder faces extreme losses if its patent is held invalid, the
generic manufacturer does not face a crippling damages judgment because it has not sold any infringing drugs. Thus, while the generic
manufacturer is formally the defendant in Hatch-Waxman litigation, it is
the patent holder-the plaintiff-that stands to lose the most.69 HatchWaxman plaintiffs have responded to this perverse structure in the way
that defendants respond in normal litigation: they pay the generic company to settle. In exchange for the generic manufacturer dropping its
challenge to the patent's validity, the patent holder provides some sort of
consideration, such as cash, market entry before the expiration of the
patent, other licenses, and so on.o These are reverse-payment settlements.
B. Structures of Reverse-Payment Settlements

Professor Hemphill has divided the types of compensation given to
generic firms in reverse-payment settlements into five broad categories.
First, and most obvious, is cash. The largest cash settlement to date was
the agreement between Bayer and Barr for Cipro.72 In that single settlement, Bayer agreed to pay Barr roughly $398 million to delay its market
entry.73 Agreements such as this seem most troublesome from an antitrust
perspective, and they have attracted a great deal of attention from regulatory authorities.74
These simple contracts are therefore giving way to a second type of
settlement in which the patent holder pays the generic manufacturer to
settle the invalidity claims as well as to acquire something of value from
the generic manufacturer. Generic manufacturers have provided licenses to their own intellectual property, promises to develop new
products for the patent holder, manufacturing services, inventory of the
drug, and promotion services. Some of these agreements are "suspect
on their face" because "the brand-name firm does not need a patent liSee generally Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1555-78 (describing the dynamics of
69.
Hatch-Waxman litigation).
See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements Between Rivals: A Survey 13
70.
(Mar. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969492.
71.

See generally id. (listing categories).

72.

See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 663; supra pp. 418-19.

73.

Ciprofloxacin III, 544 F.3d at 1328-29.

74.

Hemphill, supra note 21, at 663.

75.

Id.

76.

See Hemphill, supra note 70, at 14-16.
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cense that does not clearly cover its product, new drug development that
is unrelated to its current core business, a new source of raw material
supply, backup manufacturing, .or additional promotion."77 However,
some of them seem plausible because real synergies could exist between
the patent holder and the generic manufacturer. For example, these synergies may benefit product development, advertising, or patent licenses
to research and develop a new product.8
A third type of compensation may be present when the generic
manufacturer is entitled to, but postpones its use of, a 180-day marketexclusivity period. 79 This allows the generic manufacturer to collect
duopoly profits with the patent holder, which can amount to a substantial
sum. 0 Furthermore, the very act of acquiring and forfeiting the marketexclusivity period may be profitable for a generic manufacturer. While
the Paragraph IV filer must have made enough of an investment in the
generic drug to complete its FDA filings, other generic companies likely
will not have made such an investment. By removing the possibility of a
180-day market-exclusivity period, the Paragraph IV filing removes the
primary incentive for other generics to race to challenge the patent. This
may supplement the other forms of compensation by reducing the
amount of competition-and thereby the pressure to price the generic at
marginal cost-after the generic manufacturer does enter the market."
The fourth major type of settlement agreement is underpayment by
the generic firm. In these settlements, the patent holder provides the
drug, or a license to produce the drug, to the generic manufacturer.8 2
Though the generic manufacturer receives little or no cash payment from
the patent holder, it receives duopoly or oligopoly profits for the
77.

Hemphill, supra note 21, at 664-65.

78.

Id. at 665.

In such a case, the generic simply takes steps to postpone the start date of its exclu79.
sivity period, thus providing the original manufacturer with a longer period of market control.
This occurs when the generic manufacturer is the first to file a Paragraph IV certification for
the drug. While the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 weakened this form of compensation
by providing for forfeiture of the exclusivity period if the generic manufacturer settles with the
patent holder, this new provision only applies to ANDAs filed after December 8, 2003. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2006). To be sure, this provision does not require forfeiture upon
any settlement agreement-just upon a settlement agreement that is found to violate the antitrust laws. Another provision of the Medicare Modernization Act provides for forfeiture of the
exclusivity period if the first applicant fails to market its drug within seventy-five days of the
ANDA approval. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I). However, most settlement agreements now provide
for no judgment on the merits of the patent, thus delaying ANDA approval. See Hemphill,
supra note 7, at 1586.
80.
See Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1588-94.
81.
See id. at 1583-86 ("Generic firms other than the first filer will lag behind in the
approval process, if they have bothered to file at all; they will also be less motivated to initiate
or vigorously pursue a challenge.").
82.
See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 665-66.
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remainder of the patent term. This is, in effect, a privately negotiated
market-exclusivity period, which is shared with the patent holder in the
same way that the 180-day period awarded for a Paragraph IV filing is
shared. Finally, along these same lines, a settlement may provide for
other indirect compensation, such as settlement of unrelated disputes
between the firms.83

II.

REGULATORY APPROACHES TO LIMIT
REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

Faced with these diverse settlement structures, courts, government
agencies, and Congress have all sought to regulate reverse-payment settlements. As discussed below, they have not done so in a coherent way.
This Part surveys judicial, administrative, and legislative challenges to
reverse-payment settlements. It highlights the difficulty that courts have
faced in discerning the motivations for these agreements, as well as the
mixed messages sent by the FTC, the DOJ, and Congress. The Part analyzes the positions of these bodies, focusing on their solutions for sorting
legitimate, non-anticompetitive reverse-payment settlements from
agreements that should result in antitrust liability.
A. Courts

To date, all challenges to reverse-payment settlements have been
brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act." The first such case was In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,5 which held that an agreement be-

tween Hoescht Marion Roussel ("HMR") and Andrx Pharmaceuticals
("Andrx") violated the Sherman Act.86 HMR held a patent on Cardizem
CD, the active ingredient of which is diltiazem hydrochloride. While
HMR's patent on diltiazem hydrochloride expired before the settlement,
HMR held a patent on a controlled-release system that permitted oncedaily dosing of Cardizem CD. 8 Andrx was the first to file a Paragraph IV
certification challenging the scope of H-MR's patent, thus making Andrx
eligible for the 180-day market-exclusivity period and triggering the
See Hemphill, supra note 70, at 19-20.
83.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
84.
La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Anti85.
trust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
86.

Id. at 900.

Diltiazem HCI is a calcium channel blocker that is used in the treatment of hyper87.
tension and some arrhythmias. Cardizem CD Label, Reference ID 2867302, U.S. FOOD &
2-3 (2010), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs/label/2010/
DRUG ADMIN.,
020062s0401bl.pdf.
U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584 (filed Feb. 27, 1995).
88.
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automatic thirty-month stay."9 Just prior to the expiration of the stay,
Andrx and HMR entered into an agreement providing that Andrx would
not market a bioequivalent form of Cardizem CD-including any forms
that were off-patent-until Andrx either obtained a favorable, unappealable decision that HMR's patent was invalid or until HMR licensed
Cardizem CD to a third party. Andrx also agreed not to take any action to
terminate its rights to the 180-day market-exclusivity period, thus eliminating the incentive for other generic manufacturers to challenge HMR's
patent. In exchange for these concessions, HMR agreed to make quarterly payments of $10 million to Andrx, beginning when Andrx received
FDA approval to market Cardizem CD. HMR also agreed to pay Andrx
$100 million annually to stay off the market once there was a final, unappealable determination that Andrx's product did not infringe the patent
or once HMR dropped its patent-infringement suit."
After the district court granted partial summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit took up the question of "whether the Agreement was a per se illegal restraint of trade."9 It agreed with the district
court that, "at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition
in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States [was]
a classic example of a per se illegal restraint." 92 The court focused on the
effect of the settlement agreement on challenges by other market competitors. It reasoned that, "[b]y delaying Andrx's entry into the market,
the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who
could not enter until the expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of market
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer."93
Thus, the court concluded that the Agreement divided up the entire market for Cardizem CD between HMR and Andrx by blocking other
Paragraph IV challengers. Put simply, there was no incentive for other
generic manufacturers to develop Cardizem CD because they would
have to wait for Andrx to market its product before they could market
theirs. By erecting an insurmountable barrier to market entry, the settlement could not "be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce
patent rights." 94 The Sixth Circuit based its analysis entirely on the antitrust aspect of the settlement; it found that, regardless of the scope of the
patent, the agreement contravened the Sherman Act. When applied to a
simple settlement like the one in In re Cardizem CD, the Sixth Circuit's
approach makes sense. It is an uncomplicated formula that courts can
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 902.
Id. at 901-04 (describing the facts of settlement agreement).
Id. at 900.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 908.
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apply, and it does not require them to swim in the murky waters of patent
law and business judgment.
The pharmaceutical industry did not stand still. Later settlements introduced more complications, forcing courts to consider how to evaluate
agreements that were not plainly unreasonable on their face. The next
major case was Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' in

which the Eleventh Circuit upheld two settlement agreements for patent
litigation regarding certain crystalline forms of terazosin hydrochloride.9
The first agreement resulted from a Paragraph IV filing by Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals ("Zenith"), in which Zenith challenged the validity
and scope of two of Abbott Laboratories' patents. Abbott and Zenith
entered into an agreement whereby Zenith would acknowledge the validity of Abbott's patents and refrain from entering the terazosin
hydrochloride market until either the patents expired or other generics
entered the market. In exchange, Abbott agreed to pay Zenith $3 million
up front, $3 million after three months, and $6 million every three
months thereafter." The second agreement arose from a patentinfringement suit that Abbott filed against Geneva Pharmaceuticals
("Geneva"). Geneva had filed a Paragraph IV certification for a terazosin
hydrochloride product that Geneva admitted infringed one of Abbott's
patents. 9 In exchange for an agreement from Geneva not to enter the
terazosin hydrochloride market until the patent's expiration, other generic entry, or an unappealable judgment of invalidity or
noninfringement, Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month.'tm
When a group of private plaintiffs challenged these agreements, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that "the
Agreements were per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act" because
they "essentially allocat[ed] the entire United States market for terazosin
drugs to Abbott, who shared its monopoly profits with other cartel members during the life of the Agreements."o' The district court relied on
four aspects of the Geneva agreement to conclude that it was anticompetitive:

Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d I294 (11th Cir. 2003).
95.
Id. at 1298. Terazosin hydrochloride is used to treat hypertension and benign
96.
prostatic hyperplasia. Application Number 75-140, Final Printed Labeling, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., 2 (2000), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs/nda/98/75140
Terazosin%20Hydrochloriderpmtlbl.pdf.
97.
U.S. Patent No. 5,412,095 (filed May 20, 1994); U.S. Patent No. 5,504,207 (filed
Oct. 18, 1994).
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1298-301 (describing facts of settlement agreement).
98.
99.
Geneva allegedly infringed the '207 patent. Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1300-01.
100.
Id. at 1301.
101.
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(1) Geneva's promise not to market its terazosin capsule until the
Agreement terminated; (2) Geneva's promise not to market its
terazosin tablet until the Agreement terminated; (3) Geneva's
promise not to sell its rights in its capsule and tablet ANDAs until the Agreement terminated; and (4) Geneva's promise to aid
Abbott in opposing any attempt by other ANDA applicants to
enter the market before the Agreement terminated.10 2
The district court reached the same conclusion regarding the Zenith
103
agreement for similar reasons.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began by highlighting the inherent
tension involved in these settlements: "If this case merely involved one
firm making monthly payments to potential competitors in return for
their exiting or refraining from entering the market, we would readily
affirm the district court's order. This is not such a case, however, because
one of the parties owned a patent."'" It explained that the scope of the
patent was particularly important for evaluating the antitrust elements of
the settlement, "as market allocation agreements . . . are at the heart of

the patent right and cannot trigger the per se label."' 5 In undertaking its
patent-scope analysis, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that sham or frivolous lawsuits can give rise to antitrust liability if the settlement affected
rights that were included in the patent, but subsequent invalidity alone
cannot lead to such liability.'" Furthermore, because patent holders have
a right to settle costly litigation and to divide markets territorially,' 7 the
court found that the settlement could very well be within the scope of the
patent.0 8 Finally, the court opined that, because the Sixth Circuit "did not
purport to measure the several provisions [of the In re Cardizem CD settlement agreement] against the exclusionary power of the patent[] or
differentiate between provisions that fell within the scope of the patent's
protection and those that did not," the Sixth Circuit's opinion in In re
Cardizem CD was fundamentally flawed.'"
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated this view two years later in ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC,'o which centered around a patent for ScheringPlough's extended-release coating on potassium chloride supplements."'
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1301-02.
See id. at 1302.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1309.
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FIC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1056-76 (11th Cir. 2005).
See id. at l058.
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In agreements with two separate generic manufacturers, Schering-Plough
agreed to make up-front payments in exchange for the generic manufacturers' promise not to enter the market before an agreed-upon date and
for licenses to some of the generic manufacturers' patented products."2
The FTC challenged both of these settlements pursuant to Section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."'
An administrative law judge ("AL") ruled that neither settlement was
per se invalid and that each should be evaluated relative to the exclusionary potential of the patent." 4 On appeal, the full Commission reversed
the AU."' The unanimous Commission explained that, while it was
"not. . . prepared to say that all such payments should be viewed as per
se illegal or 'inherently suspect,' ",1"it is logical to conclude that the
quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer
entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation
compromise.""' Finally, the Commission concluded that, with respect to
the parties in the case, "settlements under which the generic 'receives
anything of value' and agrees to defer its own research and development,
production or sales activities" are prohibited."'
The Commission's decision then went before the Eleventh Circuit,
which reversed and reiterated its test from Valley Drug: "[T]he proper
analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects."" 9 The court explained that this analysis ensured "a delicate
balance . . . between the [patent and antitrust] regulatory schemes." 2 0 As
to the Commission's argument that Congress, in passing the HatchWaxman Act, did not intend to immunize reverse-payment settlements
from antitrust scrutiny and "specifically decided that it wanted to encourage patent challenges for pharmaceutical products,"21 the court held
that "[r]everse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman
process." 22 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's position is clear: if the terms of a
This is an overpayment-type settlement, as described supra in notes 75-78 and the
112.
accompanying text. Significantly, the ESI settlement was negotiated under the supervision of a
U.S. Magistrate Judge. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1060-61.
113.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1061.
114.
Id. at 1062.
115.
In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 991 (2003).
116.
117.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 1062.
118.
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066.
119.
Id. at 1067 (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964)).
120.
In re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 990.
121.
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride An122.
tritust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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reverse-payment settlement fall within the scope of a party's patent
rights, which rights were obtained in good faith and were valid at the
time of the agreement, the agreement will not result in liability under the
antitrust laws.
In a 2006 case, the Second Circuit built upon the Eleventh Circuit's
approach. 2 The Second Circuit was confronted with a settlement
agreement between AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals ("AstraZeneca"), the
holder of a patent on tamoxifen citrate, a popular breast cancer drug, and
Barr Laboratories ("Barr"), which had filed a Paragraph IV certification
challenging the patent's validity. Astrazeneca agreed to pay Barr $21
million and grant it a non-exclusive license to sell-but not manufacture-tamoxifen in the United States.124 In exchange, Barr agreed to
change its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph 111 certification and
delay manufacture of its own tamoxifen until the patent's expiration. 25
The Second Circuit began from the Schering-Ploughcourt's premise
that "reverse payments are particularly to be expected in the drug-patent
context because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages them."126 It then announced its analysis: "[S]o long as the patent
litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is
seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and
distribution of the patented product." 27 The Second Circuit went on to
explain that this particular settlement agreement "did not extend the patent monopoly by restraining the introduction or marketing of unrelated
or non-infringing products";'m "ended all litigation between Zeneca and
Barr and thereby opened the tamoxifen patent to immediate challenge by
other potential generic manufacturers";'29 and "did not entirely foreclose
123.
See Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d
187, 193 (2d. Cir. 2006).
124.
Id. at 193. This is an example of using authorized generics as part of a reversepayment settlement's compensation. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125.
In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-94.
126.
Id. at 206.
127.
Id. at 208-09.
128.
Id. at 213. The court added that, "[iut is thus unlike the agreement the Sixth Circuit
held per se illegal in [In re Cardizem CD], . . . which included not only a substantial reverse
payment but also an agreement that the generic manufacturer would not market non-infringing
products." Id. at 213-14.
129.
Id. at 214. The court went on to conclude that "[t]he Agreement thus avoided a
'bottleneck' of the type created by the agreements in Valley Drug and [In re Cardizem CD],
which prevented other generic manufacturers from obtaining approval for their own generic
versions from the FDA." Id. at 215. The court also concluded that later challengers were
"spurred by the additional incentive (at the time) of potentially securing the 180-day exclusivity period available upon a victory in a subsequent infringement lawsuit." Id. at 214. As
Professor Hemphill points out, this conclusion is incorrect. Hemphill, supra note 7, at
1583-86. Only the first ANDA application with a Paragraph IV certification is eligible for an
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competition in the market for tamoxifen" because the license from AstraZeneca to Barr resulted in a net reduction in cost to consumers of
approximately five percent.130
It remains unclear whether the Second Circuit's analysis is the same
as the Eleventh Circuit's or more restrictive. While the Second Circuit
distinguished the Tamoxifen settlement from the Valley Drug settlement,
it did not say if that distinction mattered. In other words, it did not say
that it would have ruled differently from the Eleventh Circuit on the facts
of Valley Drug.

Furthermore, uncertainty now surrounds the Second Circuit's commitment to stand by its Tamoxifen ruling. In Arkansas CarpentersHealth
& Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG,"' decided in April 2010, the Second Cir-

cuit affirmed a district court holding that relied on Tamoxifen as
precedent. 3 2 The panel, however, noted "several reasons why [Arkansas
Carpenters] might be appropriate for reexamination" en banc,'" including a DOJ brief that urged the court to reconsider the Tamoxifen
precedent, the increased rate of reverse-payment settlements since Tamoxifen, statements condemning reverse-payment settlements made by
Representative Waxman after Tamoxifen, and an error in the Tamoxifen
court's understanding of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory framework.'4
While the full court denied that motion for rehearing,' it did so over the
strong objection of Judge Pooler, who concluded that, "[i]t will be up to
the Supreme Court or Congress to resolve the conflict among the Courts
of Appeals." 3 6 Despite that invitation, the Supreme Court recently declined to grant certiorari.'
Thus, courts have struggled with how to find both the appropriate
antitrust standard of review and how to apply it. While the Sixth Circuit
focused on the antitrust aspect of the settlement agreement, the Eleventh
and Second Circuits placed more emphasis on the exclusionary rights of

exclusivity period. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107 (2010). In this particular case, the incentive did not

seem to matter: three other generic manufacturers quickly followed Barr in filing Paragraph
IV certifications after the settlement. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212 n.25.
In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 215.
130.
Ark. Carpenters 1, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d
131.
Cir. 2010).
Id. at 110.
132.
Id. at 108.
133.
Id. at 108-10.
134.
625 F.3d 779.
Ark. Carpenters II,
135.

136.

Id. at 782 (Pooler, J., dissenting).

137.

La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011), denying cert. to Ark.

Carpenters I,604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). Note that neither Justice Sotomayor nor Justice
Kagan participated in this decision, presumably because of their involvement with this case in
their prior positions at the Second Circuit and Department of Justice, respectively.
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the patent holder. The legality of reverse-payment settlements currently
seems to turn on where a case is brought.
B. FederalTrade Commission

Administrative agencies have also been unable to clear up the legal
uncertainty surrounding these agreements. Since the emergence of reverse-payment settlements, the FTC has closely monitored their
legality.13 In the early days of these agreements, the FTC sought to
monitor them through consent decrees.139 In 2000, the first such dispute
began with the FTC's challenge to the settlement agreement between
Abbott and Geneva that would later give rise to Valley Drug.'4 In seeking to ensure compliance with federal trade and antitrust laws, the FTC
order imposed restrictions on further agreements both between the parties and with third parties; required the parties to keep the FTC informed
of their future settlements; and required that Geneva waive its exclusivity
period to prevent the "bottleneck" problem that so troubled the Sixth
Circuit in In re Cardizem CD.141 Thus, while not finding the terazosin
reverse-payment settlement per se unlawful, the FTC's efforts to restrict
and monitor future agreements clearly demonstrated its concern about
the settlement. At this point, the FTC's position was essentially that reverse-payment settlement agreements did not violate competition laws
but that they had the potential to become illegal when used either to
block other generic challenges or to exceed the scope of the relevant patents. The FTC vigilantly monitored these agreements, but it did not have
a set of rules, or safe harbors, describing when agreements would be acceptable.
The FTC clarified its position with In re Schering-Plough Corp.142In
In re Schering-Plough,the unanimous Commission announced a simple
rule declaring the circumstances under which reverse-payment settlements are illegal: if the terms of the settlement require the generic to
138.
See, e.g., Examining Issues Related to Competition in the PharmaceuticalMarketplace: A Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 6
(2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n) ("Such agreements
may be pro-competitive, they may be competitive-neutral, and, of course, they may be anticompetitive.... [T]hey have the potential to raise antitrust issues . . . .").
139.
Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Health Care and the FTC: The
Agency as Prosecutor and Policy Wonk, Remarks at the Antitrust in HealthCare Conference
5-6 (May 12, 2005), availableat http://ftc.gov/speechesleibowitz/050512healthcare.pdf.
140.
Complaint, In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (FTC May 22, 2000).
For the terms of the settlement, see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
141.
See La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
142.
In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956 (2003); see also supra notes 110-122
and accompanying text (discussing Schering-Plough).
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delay entry and the patent holder to provide monetary compensation to
the generic in exchange for that delay, the agreement is illegal.143 The
Commission simply reasoned that "the quid pro quo for the payment was
an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise."'"
The Commission's rationale centers on a theory that entry dates
should be determined only by the parties' views of the strength of the
patent.145 By giving the pioneer patent holder a patent term that is equal
to its expectations of the validity of the patent, the innovator receives a
just prize, and the public gets access to the generic at the earliest possible date.146 In contrast, if reverse payments are permitted, the innovator
may seek monopoly profits in excess of the patent's strength and may
share these high profits with a generic manufacturer to avoid chal-

lenges.147
Recent enforcement actions have reiterated this interpretation of the
FTC's position, 14 and the Commission has made no secret of its desire to
produce a circuit split to improve its chances of Supreme Court review.149
The FTC has recently filed court challenges to agreements between
Cephalon, Inc. and Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,so and it has shown no
signs of backing down. In a recent address, Chairman Leibowitz proclaimed that "the Commission has made stopping these deals a top
priority." 5'

In re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 988.
143.
Id.
144.
See Thomas B. Leary, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Issue in the Set145.
tlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part II, Address Before the American Bar
Association's Antitrust Healthcare Program (May 17, 2001), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/learyllearypharmaceuticalsettlement.shtm.
Id.
146.
147.
See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 989.
See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009); FTC v.
148.
Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008).
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs: Hearing on H.R. 1902 Before the
149.
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, I10th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/070502reversepayments.pdf ("It's public
knowledge that we're looking to bring a case that will create a clearer split in the circuits, and
we're hopeful that the Supreme Court will review the Tamoxifen decision.").
Watson Pharm., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081; Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d 21. Following
150.
transfer of Watson Pharmaceuticalsto the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, the court, relying on Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 344 F.3d
1294 (llth Cir. 2003), granted the Watson defendants' motion to dismiss the FTC's claim on
February 22, 2010. In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga.
2010).
Leibowitz, supra note 10, at 4.
151.
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C. U.S. Departmentof Justice

The DOJ has also provided its views on reverse-payment settlements, notably in amicus briefs before the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States.152 Its views have
not been consistent, however, leading some to refer to it as a "switch hitter" that "has had little trouble changing its stance on reverse
payments."'
In its first foray into the world of reverse-payment settlements, the
DOJ opposed the FTC's petition for certiorari by the Supreme Court in
Schering-Plough.5 4 The DOJ acknowledged that "[reverse] payments
can be a device for the sharing of monopoly rents made possible by the
alleged infringer's exclusion from the market, and may result in less
competition than would likely have prevailed in the absence of the payment." 5 It concluded, though, that "the mere presence of a reverse
payment in the Hatch-Waxman context is not sufficient to establish that
the settlement is unlawful."'" Rather, because "the Hatch-Waxman context creates a litigation dynamic that makes some settlements
reasonable," the DOJ suggested that "an appropriate legal standard
should take into account the relative likelihood of success of the parties'
claims, viewed ex ante."' This likelihood-of-success analysis should
involve an "assess[ment of] the strength of the patent in the context of
the infringement settlement itself."' The DOJ specifically rejected the
FTC's approach of measuring the "'expected value' of the patent
holder's lawsuit against the generic,"'59 which it characterized as "reflect[ing] a high degree of suspicion of any reverse payment
settlement."10 Finally, the DOJ recommended that the Supreme Court
deny certiorari because determining the amount of the payment given
to the generic would necessarily require valuing licenses that were part
of the settlement 6' and because the case suffered from procedural
152.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273); Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's
Invitation, Ark. CarpentersII, 625 F.3d 779 (No. 05-2851-cv(L)).
153.
See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 6, at 18.
154.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Schering-Plough, 548 U.S. 919 (No.
05-273).
155.
Id. at 9.
156.
Id. at 11.
157.
Id.
158.
Id. (quoting Brief of States as Amici Curiae in Support of Federal Trade Commission at 18, Schering-Plough,548 U.S. 919 (No.05-273)).
159.
Id.
160.
Id. at 12.
161.
Id. at 12-13. Recall that Schering-Plough involved an overpayment-type settlement
in which Schering-Plough licensed several drugs from the generic challengers.
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infirmities at the ALJ stage.162 The Supreme Court followed the DOJ's
recommendation and denied the petition on June 26, 2006.
The DOJ again opposed a per se rule of illegality in its amicus brief
accompanying the certiorari petition in Tamoxifen.'63 It contended that
"the public policy favoring settlements, and the right of a patent holder
to exclude competition within the scope of its valid patent, would be
frustrated by adoption of a legal standard that subjected patent settlements involving reverse payments to automatic or near-automatic
invalidation."'" Instead, the DOJ reiterated its relative-likelihood-of-

success test from the Schering-Plough amicus brief.'6 1 While the DOJ
disagreed with the Tamoxifen standard-which did not require inquiry
into the strength of the patent-it nonetheless counseled against granting
certiorari because of the unusual facts of the case.'66 The Supreme Court
agreed again and denied certiorari.
Thus, the DOJ's first two statements on reverse-payment settlements-both made under the Bush Administration-seemed to follow
the Eleventh Circuit. The DOJ emphatically rejected the per se or presumptively invalid approaches as too harsh, and it similarly rejected the
"objective baselessness" standard articulated by the Second Circuit as
too lenient.
This position, as well as the DOJ's antitrust enforcement priorities,
has changed markedly during the Obama Administration. With his appointment of Christine Varney as the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the DOJ's Antitrust Division, President Obama signaled a shift
to a more robust antitrust enforcement regime. 67 In her first major
speech in office, Assistant Attorney General Varney announced that
"vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in the Government's response to economic crises to ensure that markets remain
competitive." 68 This enhanced scrutiny has been applied to reversepayment settlements, as the DOJ now believes that "a rule of antitrust
162.

Id. at 13-14.

163.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 551 U.S.

1144 (2007) (No. 06-830).

Id. at 11.
164.
Id. at 12.
165.
166.
Id. at 19. Recall that the case involved a settlement following a district court judgment of patent invalidity, followed by vacatur of that judgment while the appeal was pending.
Id. at 19. Such vacatur is no longer permitted under the Supreme Court's holding in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
167.
Stephen Labaton, Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust Rules, N.Y. TIMES,

May 11, 2009, at Al.
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
168.
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era, Address Before the Center for
American Progress 4 (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/24571 1.pdf.
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immunity [is] particularly inappropriate in this context."'69 Indeed, even
the Obama White House has spoken out against reverse-payment settlements. 70
It is thus unsurprising that the DOJ took a new position in its brief to
the Second Circuit in Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG in July 2009:

The anticompetitive potential of reverse payments in the HatchWaxman context in exchange for the alleged infringer's agreement not to compete and to eschew any challenge to the patent is
sufficiently clear that such agreements should be treated as
presumptively unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Defendants may rebut that presumption by providing a reasonable explanation of the payment, so that there is no reason to
find that the settlement does not provide a degree of competition reasonably consistent with the parties' contemporaneous
evaluations of their prospects of litigation success.
The DOJ now appears to reject its previous position that these settlements should be judged by a rule of reason after an inquiry into the
strength of the patent. 172 Rather, it now contends that "[i]t is neither necessary nor appropriate to determine whether the patent holder would
likely have prevailed in the patent-infringement litigation in determining
liability for a . .. reverse payment settlement." 7 1
D. Congress

Finally, there has been much talk of banning reverse-payment settlements through legislation. Senator Kohl introduced the first such
attempt on January 17, 2007.14 That bill, titled the Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act, stated that "settlements which include a payment from a brand name manufacturer to a generic manufacturer to
delay entry by generic drugs are anti-competitive and contrary to the
169.
Phil Weiser, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Doctrine, Competition Policy, and International Dialogue, Address Before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association 4 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/251859.pdf.
170.
OFFICE OF MGMT.
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 28 (2009), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
usbudget/fy I 0/pdf/fy I0-newera.pdf.
171.
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, supra note 14, at
10 (emphasis added).
.
172.
The DOJ explicitly commented on its policy reversal: "We acknowledge some tension between statements in our Joblove brief and our current views." Id. at 26.
173.
Id. at 24.
174.
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007).

&
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interests of consumers."17 1 It proposed to ban agreements in which "an
ANDA filer receives anything of value [or] agrees not to research, develop, market, or sell the ANDA product for any period of time." 7 6
While this bill never received a vote by the full Senate, Senator Kohl
reintroduced the bill in substantially the same form on February 3,
2009."' This bill is still pending and was amended to declare reversepayment settlements presumptively unlawful instead of per se invalid.178 The bill allows the presumption to be overcome with "clear and
convincing evidence that the pro-competitive benefits of agreement
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement."" 9 This change
brings the pending bill in line with the DOJ's position in its Arkansas
Carpentersbrief.'80

Representative Bobby Rush introduced a close analog in the House
on March 25, 2009.'"' The inclusion of a per se prohibition on reversepayment settlements in the House health-care reform bill drew praise
from FTC Chairman Leibowitz. Leibowitz commended the House for
adopting a "measure [that] will put an end to the sweetheart deals between brand and generic pharmaceutical companies that force consumers
to wait-sometimes years-for more affordable generic drugs." 82 The
House bill was later added to the House health-care reform bill,"3 though
it was not included in the Senate health-care or reconciliation bills that
were ultimately enacted.'
Thus, Congress has made several attempts to regulate reversepayment settlements, but none have yet succeeded. Furthermore, these
attempts have painted with very broad strokes; the bills have proposed
either bans on reverse-payment settlements or a presumption-ofillegality approach, leaving little room for a case-by-case analysis of the
economic reality of the transaction. While the amended Senate bill
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. S. 316 § 2(a)(l l).
Id. S. 316 § 3(2).
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111 th Cong. (2009).
Id. S. 369 § 3(a)(2)(B) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary Oct. 15, 2009).
Id. S. 369 § 28(a)(2)(B).

180.
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Reverse Payments, PATENTLY-O
(Oct. 16, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/patent-reform-reversepayments.html.
181.
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009).
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement by FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz on
182.
Adoption of the Pay for Delay Amendment to the America's Affordable Health Choices Act of
2009 by the House Energy and Commerce Comm. (July 31, 2009), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/pay4delay.shtm.
America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111 th Cong. §2563
183.
(as reported by H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Oct. 14, 2009).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
184.
(2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010).
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leaves open the possibility of an exception to the presumption, this sort
of ex post review will, in practice, likely have a chilling effect on patent
settlements of both a pro-competitive and anticompetitive nature. 85
This Part has shown that the various branches of the U.S. government have all considered the reverse-payment settlements problem, yet
none has been able to agree on a regulatory solution. The courts have
divided between a per se rule of illegality and rule-of-reason approaches.
The FTC has advocated a ban on payments, but it has not been able to
effectuate this standard in litigation. The Department of Justice has
shifted between a rule-of-reason and a presumption of illegality. Finally,
Congress has failed to agree on the substance of proposed bills. The current regulatory landscape is, at best, confused.
III.

FAILINGS OF THE UNILATERAL APPROACHES

The preceding survey of regulatory approaches highlights a central
theme in reverse-payment settlement regulation to date: while all relevant governmental actors have expressed some preference about these
settlements, there is little agreement on the details, and no governmental
actor has suggested a cooperative solution. Comparative institutional
analysis counsels against this fragmented, unilateral approach. Different
governmental actors have different competencies, and to achieve the
most efficient outcome, any regulatory proposal should seek to capitalize
on these institutional strengths. The following section applies the teachings of comparative institutional choice to the reverse-payment
settlement problem. It proposes a common-sense regulatory scheme in
which Congress outlines broad policy goals, the FTC crafts safe-harbor
rules based on its knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry, and courts
fill in the blanks by drawing on these explicit policy statements. The resulting scheme would be superior to any of the current unilateral
proposals. This Part concludes by examining how the regulatory details
of such a system might look.
A. Regulatory Goals & Constraints

To resolve the question of what role different institutions should play
in regulating reverse-payment settlements, we must first determine the
185.
The FTC itself has highlighted this chilling effect. See Supplemental Brief for the
Petitioner at 4, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273) ("A key
drawback to [ex post review of the legality of reverse-payment settlements]--discussed in the
Commission's opinion, but not addressed in the United States' brief-is that it places parties
contemplating settlement in the predicament of not knowing, at the time of settlement,

whether particular settlement terms will appear unreasonable to a future antitrust tribunal.").
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desired goals of such regulation.' Fortunately, in the context of reversepayment settlements, the controversial points that have defined the contours of the disagreements have clearly defined the relevant policy goals.
The FTC's position, as well as the DOJ's, is that the regulatory structure
must be pro-competitive and ensure the earliest possible entry of generic
drugs to the marketplace.m Such a goal is consistent with the general
policies of antitrust law: absent a compelling reason, the public policy of
the United States favors a free-market system."'
Second, nearly all of the players in the current debate agree that any
regulatory system should respect the exclusionary rights accorded to
holders of valid patents.'" This is consistent with our tradition of using
patent rights as an incentive for innovation.'90 Our economy is built on a
foundation of strong intellectual property rights, and since the Founding,
Congress has exercised its power to grant patents "[t]o promote the ...
useful Arts."' 9 ' Further, our legal traditions clearly recognize that these
rights cast a penumbra within which the patent holder may license and
enforce the patent as he wishes.192
186.
See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 26, at 1115 ("Institutional choice theory suggests
that the goals should be articulated first, and then institutions' competence at meeting those
goals can be compared.").

187.
188.
economic
189.

See, e.g., Leibowitz, supra note 10.
See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) ("The heart of our national
policy long has been faith in the value of competition.").
See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir.

2003); Confirmation Hearings on FederalAppointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on

the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 958 (2009) (statement of Christine Varney, Nominee for Asst. Att'y
Gen. for Antitrust) ("Lawful patents should be enforced and upheld until their expiration. A
patent holder who enters into a commercial arrangement to allow a competitor to enter the
market prior to the patent's expiration would most likely be procompetitive."); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 16, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273)
(accepting that patent rights should not necessarily be curtained, but contending that, "[u]nlike
forms of property that are defined in terms of title to tangible items with clearly defined
boundaries, the exercise of rights conferred even by a valid patent requires that the boundaries
of the patent's coverage be delimited in relation to an accused infringing product"). While the
political branches have not explicitly acknowledged this goal, none of their proposed regulatory efforts have sought to curtail valid patent rights. See supra notes 174-185 (discussing
Congress's proposed bills, which are silent on curtailing patent rights).
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6
190.
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175, 181 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) ("Society may

give an exclusive right to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility ....
); see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN EcoNOMic REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 23-25 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz

Machlup).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
191.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (authorizing territorial licensing); Standard Oil
192.

Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931) ("An interchange of patent rights and a division
of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims is
frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation.").
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Given the paramount importance of patents in the pharmaceutical
industry, a third policy goal must be to maximize predictability and uniformity. The teachings of the law and economics movement have made
clear that predictable background rules are crucial to facilitate private
ordering.' 3 If each transaction-in this case, each settlement-is a potential source of legal liability for the parties, fewer legitimate
transactions will take place. This concern has dominated commercial law
in the United States, and it has prompted a number of procedural devices
to maximize predictability outside of the settlement context, notably the
many safe-harbor provisions built into the Securities and Exchange Act
regulations.194 Furthermore, uniformity is important to ensure the appearance of a fair and impartial regulatory system. The appearance of
regulatory impropriety in these already opaque settlement agreements
may lead to public distrust of the regulatory regime and prompt unnecessary and radical changes, like the per se bans on reverse-payment
settlements seen in some recent bills.
Finally, any regulatory system should seek to minimize the costs that
it creates. For example, the adjudicative process-with its formalities
and generalist judges and juries-is a notoriously expensive way to resolve disputes. 95 Agencies, however, offer cheaper alternatives because
of their relaxed evidentiary standards and relatively expedited litigation
schedules. In seeking to reform the regulatory system governing reversepayment settlements, we should be mindful of institutional efficiencies
both to reduce cost to the parties and to reduce the overall cost to society.
B. InstitutionalCompetencies

1. Courts
In the battle over reverse-payment settlement regulation, courts have,
so far, played the most prominent role. Although the FTC and DOJ can
193.
A fundamental insight of Professor Ronald Coase's work is that low transaction
costs favor the most efficient allocation of resources. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 15 (1960); see also Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcONOMics 855, 858 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume.
eds., 2d ed. 2008).
194.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 230.175, 230.501-508, 230.901-905 (2010). The
SEC's safe harbors are particularly relevant in the antitrust context, because the securities
statutes, like the antitrust statutes, are quite short relative to the regulations that have been
built up around them. In other words, the SEC's regulations provide an example of how clear
rules develop from ambiguous statutes to promote private ordering.
195.
See KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 149 ("Judicial independence, which characterizes
the beginning and end of many institutional analyses of the courts, comes at a high price.").
The average cost of patent litigation if a case proceeds to trial was estimated to exceed $1.5
million in 2001. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1447, 1546 n.167 (2003).
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bring enforcement actions to express their views, those actions are ultimately adjudicated in a federal courtroom. Furthermore, while Congress
has expressed its disapproval of reverse-payment settlements, it has
failed to take any action to curb them. As to the legality of reversepayment settlements, the agencies and Congress have spoken in a whisper beneath the bench's bullhorn.
To a large degree, this system seems to be working. Courts are well
equipped and flexible enough to handle factually complex cases, particularly because of their ability to order formal discovery.'96 They are also
well suited to inquire into the merits of a settlement, as settlements are
essentially instruments of judicial creation. To the extent that reversepayment settlements involve compensation in connection with a patent,
courts are arguably the best institutions to apply the complex doctrines
of patent law and determine a patent's scope. 9 7
So, with all of these advantages for the courts, what has gone
wrong? The first problem arises from a fundamental feature of the judiciary: federal courts are very good at applying broad policies to discrete
cases. Unfortunately, the relevant policy under which to judge reversepayment settlements is not clearly articulated.'99 While courts may seek
guidance from the antitrust principles espoused by the Sherman Act,
they may also look to the pro-innovation policies of the Patent Act and
Article I of the Constitution.'" Some have argued that the HatchWaxman Act clearly weighs against a pro-patent approach, primarily
because of its incentives for patent validity challenges. 20 This assertion,
however, ignores the reality that most courts have found that reverse196.

See KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 126.

197.
This premise, however, has not been unquestioned. Some scholars have accepted
that courts are superior institutions for adjudicating patent disputes, yet they have questioned
whether the current court structure for patent cases is efficient. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore,
Are District CourtJudges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1, 39
(2001) (concluding "that district court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33%
of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit" and contending that "[e]xpedited appeals of a
limited number of claim construction issues would strike the appropriate balance" between
accuracy and certainty); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on

Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 881 (2002) (proposing "a [trial] court composed of individuals who would have some exposure to scientific methodology but who would rely heavily
on court-appointed experts"); Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in
Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposalfor a Specialized Patent
Trial Court with a Rule of GreaterDeference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1410 (2004) (proposing the creation of a U.S. patent trial court, which the Federal Circuit would give greater
deference for rulings on claim construction and prosecution history estoppel).
Cf Robertson, supra note 26, at 1119 (contending that the policy rationale underly198.
ing the forum non conveniens doctrine is "extremely imprecise").
See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (ll th Cir.
199.
2003).
See, e.g., Carrier,supra note 22, at 64; Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1614.
200.
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payment settlements are a natural outgrowth from the Act-that "patents, payments, and settlement are, in a sense, all symbiotic components
that must work together in order for the larger abstract to succeed."20 '
While Congress may have intended to put a thumb on the scale to disfavor patent protection, 202. it by no means clearly articulated that policy. As
a result, some courts, like the Sixth Circuit, favor a robust antitrust policy, while others, like the Eleventh Circuit and Second Circuit, give more
weight to patent protection. This split stems not from an institutional
failure of the courts but rather from the lack of clear guidance from
lawmakers.
Furthermore, the political process has also failed to instruct the
courts as to the relevant factors to consider in evaluating these settlements. While the pending Senate bill does include a list of relevant
concerns-such as the length of time remaining until the expiration of
the patent, the value to consumers if the ANDA is approved, and the
form and amount of consideration received by the generic in resolving
the infringement claim 20 -there is nothing currently on the books. The
Hatch-Waxman Act arguably hints at a policy that favors the litigation of
patent-infringement claims by, for instance, providing an exclusivity period to Paragraph IV challengers; this implies that patent validity is
relevant, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Schering-Plough.2 04 However,
even that factor was not clearly articulated, forcing courts to grapple
with the problem of identifying other relevant factors.
This lack of guidance has led to irregularity. The district courts that
have considered the reverse-payment settlement problem have reached
a wide range of results.205 While this uniformity problem may be fixed
on appeal, at least within circuits, such a situation raises two problems.
First, appeals take several years, during which the parties to the settlement may suffer the negative financial consequences of an unfavorable
district court decision.206 While a ruling against a reverse-payment
201.

See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FrC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11 th Cir. 2005).

202.
For example, Congress has proposed bills that suggested either per se rules against
reverse-payment settlements or a presumption-of-illegality standard. See supra Part II.B.
203.
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (as
reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary Oct. 15, 2009).
204.

Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066.

205.
Compare Ciprofloxacin II,363 F.Supp. 2d 514 (rejecting antitrust challenge), with
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348-49 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (adopting per se standard and finding antitrust violations), order rev'd sub nom. Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
206.
As one study noted, "[a] decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to invalidate an Eli Lilly patent on Prozac in 2000, less than two years before the patent was set to expire, caused Lilly's stock price to drop 31 percent in a day." Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005). Of course, the effect
of a negative district court ruling should not be so significant because of the possibility for
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settlement would be unlikely to have such disastrous consequences for a
company, it is reasonable to assume that opening a patent up to invalidity
challenges by voiding a settlement would not be met with investor optimism. Second, building a coherent body of law through appellate
207
decision-making is a very slow process. While this uncertainty at the
district-court level will be alleviated after the appellate courts have had
more time to develop an evaluative framework, potentially procompetitive agreements will be chilled in the meantime. Furthermore, as
is apparent in the different tests adopted by the Sixth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits, even appellate review does not guarantee nationwide
uniformity. Until there is a uniform body of law governing reversepayment settlements, this uncertainty will prevent parties from entering
into these agreements-whether pro-competitive or anticompetitive.
Finally, while the rules of discovery allow courts to gather the relevant facts to evaluate a settlement agreement, these rules may not allow
courts to inquire into the entire business plan of a pharmaceutical company.208 This is most evident in the case of overpayment settlement
agreements in which the patent holder pays a generic challenger in exchange for both dropping an invalidity claim and licensing agreements
209
for some of the generic's products. While a court may decide that a
patent holder is paying a generic challenger far more than market price
for one of its patents as part of a settlement agreement, the court might
not be able to evaluate that payment in light of the value of the patent to
the company's other drug development efforts. Evaluating the payment
in these cases will require the court to inquire into the business judgment
of the parties and determine, inter alia, if the licenses were potentially
profitable for the patent holder, if the patent holder had the production
capacity to use the licenses, and if the licenses were reasonably valued
given the entire state of the market. While an agency like the FTC, which
monitors the market and employs economic analysts, may be able to answer these questions, it will be very difficult for a generalist judge to
answer them in accordance with the formal discovery procedures that are
210
used by the courts.
reversal at the Federal Circuit. Yet, this observation illustrates that adverse court rulings can
have at least some affect on stock prices.

207.

See Robertson, supra note 26, at 1120-21.

208.

See Christopher R. Leslie, RationalityAnalysisin Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 261,

264 (2010) ("[Flederal courts are generally not effective arbiters of whether alleged business
conduct is implausible.").

See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d 1056; supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text
209.
(describing overpayment-type settlements).
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 47 (2005) ("[T]here is
210.
relatively little disagreement about the basic proposition that often our general judicial system
is not competent to apply the economic theory necessary for identifying strategic behavior as
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Thus, the formal adjudicative procedures in courts suffer from a
number of challenges in the reverse-payment settlement context. While
courts can effectively apply broad policies to concrete cases and use
their formal discovery powers to compel disclosure of relevant information in a settlement, they lack the power to declare policies and to
conduct broad, inexpensive investigations. As one scholar noted, the
"limited resources of the adjudicative process" should be substituted for
the political process only if "the balance of bias, competence, and scale
favors that substitution."21 '
2. Agencies
Agencies can overcome many of the problems that trouble courts.
First, agencies have ready access to information about reverse-payment
settlements. In the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress required patent holders and generics who enter into a settlement agreement
to "file[] [the agreement] with the Assistant Attorney General [for Antitrust] and the [Federal Trade] Commission not later than 10 business
days after the date the agreements are executed."2 2 Furthermore, as discussed above, the FTC has knowledge of the entire pharmaceutical
market. As Professor Hemphill notes, the notification filings can be used
as a "key input in a comprehensive study of side deals" to identify anti-

competitive agreements. 2 3
1

The FTC is also an expert agency, and "by definition, is less likely to
make mistakes" in evaluating strategic behavior in the context of the
214
complex Hatch-Waxman statute.
Notably, the complex regulatory
framework has presented a problem for some courts in reviewing settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act. In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit
explained that, by ending litigation between Zeneca and Barr, the settlement agreement "spurred [additional challenges] by the additional
incentive (at the time) of potentially securing the 180-day exclusivity
period available upon a victory in a subsequent infringement lawsuit.""'
As Professor Hemphill has pointed out, the exclusivity period is only
available to the first generic challenger.216 The FTC, as an expert agency
anticompetitive."); Hemphill, supra note 21, at 674 ("[C]ourts have trouble correctly identifying anticompetitive strategic behavior.").
211.
KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 150.
212.

Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.

No. 108-173, 177 Stat. 2066, 2461-63 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.).
213.
214.

Hemphill, supra note 21, at 672.
Id. at 674.

215.
Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,
214 (2d Cir. 2006).
216.
Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1583.
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that deals exclusively with complex market-regulating statutes, would be
less likely than generalist judges to make such mistakes in interpreting
211
the Hatch-Waxman provisions.
Agencies are not, however, the saviors of antitrust regulation. Modem public-choice theory suggests that agency rulemaking provides an
opportunity for self-interested lobbying that ultimately leads to inefficient regulations. 2 18 Public-choice theory rests on the assumption that all
actors-legislators, industry leaders, and voters-are rational actors who
seek to maximize their personal utility by responding to the most powerful political players.2 9 Such players are traditionally smaller groups that
stand to receive a large fraction of the total legislative or administrative
benefit. 220 In the context of reverse-payment settlements, two groups play
such a role: consumer groups and unions, which wield considerable political power, and the pharmaceutical industry, which has the largest war
chest in Washington.21 While we cannot be certain which of these groups
will dominate, it is clear that both of them will advocate regulations that
are in their own interests. Because of this inherent politicization in the
rulemaking process, we must be cautious about granting the FTC too
much discretion.222
In addition to the capture problem, agencies also suffer from overspecialization. Just as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
23
been accused of being too pro-patent because of its specialization,
See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 674. Indeed, the Arkansas Carpenters panel cited
217.
Professor Hemphill's work approvingly, acknowledging that the Tamoxifen court misconstrued
the Hatch-Waxman incentive scheme. Ark. Carpenters 1, 604 F.3d at 110 (citing Hemphill,

supra note 7, at 1583-86) ("[Tlhe Tamoxifen panel appears to have relied on an erroneous
characterization of the Hatch-Waxman Act.").
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
218.
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1-37 (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979). See
generally PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber ed., 2007) (describing various
perspectives on the public choice problem).
219.
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 218, at 1-2.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
220.
THEORY OF GROUPS 127 (1965).
See Lobbying Spending Database-Top Industries, OPENSECRETs, http://
221.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).

222.
While some may contend that the Administrative Procedures Act offers sufficient
opportunity for all sides to express their views to the decision makers, this does not change the
political nature of the agency. Even if all views are adequately expressed, the resulting regulations may still be inefficient because of political pressures. To be clear, I am not arguing that
agency rulemaking will always be inefficient; I am simply contending that placing a check on
the agency's discretion minimizes the probability of inefficient regulation.
See KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 145 ("[S]pecialized courts substituted for general
223.
courts are more likely to be subject to long-term influence by information provision and even
by replacement than general courts. Courts become more attractive targets for special interest
groups as their jurisdiction is narrowed."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identify: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 818-19

(2008).
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there is reason to believe that agencies-particularly the FTC and the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ-will favor antitrust interests.224 These
agencies, while very capable of providing information about market
structure and business motives in particular situations, are far less capable of striking a desirable balance between antitrust law and patent law
because of their place within the antitrust-and not patent-regulatory
system.
3. Congress
Finally, congressional action remains an attractive alternative to both
agency and court decisions. Chief among the advantages of legislation is
the very nature of the reverse-payment settlements problem: it requires a
simple policy choice between antitrust law and patent law. As the policymaking branch of government, it is only natural to leave that balancing
to Congress. Indeed, it is a fundamental principle of our government that
"the very function of the legislative branch is to debate and determine
policy."225 Furthermore, if the policy balancing is left to the DOJ, FTC, or
courts, it may suffer from serious legitimacy challenges.226 As Hart and
Sacks explain, law itself is premised on a principle of institutional settlement that "expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly
arrived-at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are
duly changed."222
Furthermore, Congress is better equipped than the judiciary to resolve policy disputes prospectively.228 While one possibility for striking a
balance between antitrust and patent law is for the Supreme Court to rule
on the issue, such a ruling must necessarily be retrospective with respect
to the parties before the court.229 Because of the immense value at stake
in reverse-payment settlements and their increasing ubiquity in ANDA
litigation, the reliance interests of the parties are particularly important.
A prospective decision by Congress on the appropriate balance between
224.
This conclusion flows from the theories of interest-group capture discussed above.
Just as the Federal Circuit is likely to suffer from capture by the patent bar, the players who
regularly come before it, the antitrust regulatory authorities are likely to suffer from capture
by consumer lobby groups.
225.
Robertson, supra note 26, at 1122.
226.

See id.

227.
HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 4.
228.
See generally id. at 599-615 (describing the case for prospective overruling).
229.
See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that
judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were 'finding' it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is
today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.") (emphasis in original). Such a ruling would
not, of course, be retrospective with respect to settlements occurring after the ruling.
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antitrust law and patent law would allow a transition to an improved
regulatory regime without upsetting the expectations of parties to completed settlement agreements.
As with agencies, the legislature is a political creature and is subject
to capture.230 The same factors that make agencies particularly vulnerable
to capture also suggest that the legislature will over-represent majority
interests, and any proposed legislative action will need to be mindful of
that concern. 231' The self-interested behavior that public-choice theory
predicts is also particularly dangerous in the context of statutory revision.232 Unlike agency rules that can be changed without congressional
involvement, 23 3 inefficiencies that make their way into statutes are much
harder to eliminate. Furthermore, as expected, Congress has favored
bright-line rules-the per se invalidity of reverse-payment settlements
and the presumption of illegality-in its reform efforts thus far.234 Any
reform effort originating in Congress must be careful not to paint in such
broad strokes as to ban pro-competitive, lawful payments.
C. Optimizing Reform

Against this backdrop of pros and cons for each player in the regulatory system, we can formulate a prescription for reform. First, Congress
should take the lead in setting forth policy objectives to strike the balance between antitrust law and patent law. Courts are neither capable of
making nor empowered to make such decisions, and policy choices by
agencies suffer from similar legitimacy and overspecialization problems.
While Congress may be subject to capture and disproportionate political
influence, we should be less concerned about capture in Congress than in
any other institution. Simply put, Congress is "vested" with the "legislative Powers" of our government, 235 and even its biased judgments are
procedurally legitimate. Congress, however, should do no more than
strike this policy balance. Rather than risk making specific rules that are
overbroad, Congress should simply state a general principle. Unlike
Senate Bill 369,236 Congress, however, should not attempt to set forth
factors for courts and agencies to consider in evaluating agreements. Be230.

Cf Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology

in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 533 (2003) (discussing public-choice hazards in
congressional responses to the transgenic mouse patent).

Indeed, Professor Komesar "lump[s]" agencies and the legislature under the same
231.
heading-"the political process"-in his treatise. KoMESAR, supra note 26, at 9.
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
232.
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 99-100 (2009).

233.

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006).

234.
235.

See supra Part II.D.
U.S. CONsT. art I, § 1.

236.

Supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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cause reverse-payment settlements seem to evolve with regulatory interpretations, 237 Congress should allow the institution that is most in touch
with the market to lay down specific rules.
Thus, Congress should delegate rulemaking power to the FTC to (1)
promulgate safe-harbor regulations under which reverse-payment settlements will neither be presumed unlawful nor be challenged and (2) draft
rules governing which factors will be relevant in determining if an
agreement is pro-competitive-and thus valid-in enforcement actions.
These rules will provide additional guidance for courts when they are
called upon to evaluate agreements that fall outside of the regulatory safe
harbors. Furthermore, Congress should grant the FTC exclusive enforcement power over the antitrust and trade laws involved in reversepayment settlement regulation. Such a change would involve carving out
an exception to the general private right of action provided in 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 and expanding the FTC's enforcement authority under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Finally, Congress should provide for review of
the FTC's decisions in a single appellate court: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 23 8 To date, Congress has only
granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit. In this context, granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
the Federal Circuit may place a thumb on the scale in favor of patents
because of the Federal Circuit's central role in patent law, so the D.C.
Circuit may be a more neutral arbiter.239
This proposal capitalizes on two key features of the FTC. First, as an
expert agency that already receives data on every settlement agreement
that arises from the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FTC is structured such that

See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 682-88.
Several statutory review provisions instruct challengers to appeal directly to a specific circuit court of appeals. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN.'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §10(b) (1947), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/
PUBLIC/APA/REFERENCESIREFERENCEWORKS/AGO9.HTM; 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a)
(2006 & Supp. I) (granting the D.C. Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over military
commissions); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most patent disputes).
Some have concluded that this sort of bias at the Federal Circuit is illusory. See
239.
237.
238.

Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M. Lister & J. Clayton Everett, Jr., Antitrust Law at the Federal
Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739,

773 (2001) ("The majority's decision in Nobelphanna I may lend some credence to the notion
that the Federal Circuit, or at least certain Federal Circuit judges, harbor a bias against imposing antitrust liability on IP owners. The court's ultimate ruling, however, upholding the
antitrust verdict against a patentee-one of the very few cases in the Walker Process line ever
to impose antitrust liability on a patentee-tends to show that this bias is more a matter of
perception than reality."). My proposal to consolidate these cases in the D.C. Circuit is simply
crafted out of an abundance of caution.
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it may easily make these rules without substantially greater resources.
Second, because the safe harbors would be entitled to Chevron deference
241
in federal courts, they would provide a stable and predictable backdrop
against which parties could negotiate Hatch-Waxman settlement agreements. Indeed, parties would be assured that any agreements falling
within these safe harbors would be presumed valid by reviewing courts
pursuant to the Chevron doctrine. This change would facilitate private
ordering and the execution of pro-competitive settlement agreements.
Moreover, granting the FTC exclusive enforcement authority would
promote uniformity by concentrating enforcement power in one agency.
This change would keep courts from having to fill in the blanks in a
regulatory framework before the agency that is charged with that task
has an opportunity to confront the problem. Courts would still be called
upon to resolve disputes that arise outside of the FTC's safe harbors, but
many of the challenges that have faced courts to date would no longer be
242
present. Courts would not be without congressional guidance on how
to strike the appropriate balance between antitrust and patent law, and
the FTC's enforcement guidelines would indicate to courts which factors
the FTC believes are most relevant for identifying an anticompetitive
agreement. Similarly, this policy guidance would improve the predictability and uniformity of court decisions, and the FTC's regulatory safe
harbors would reduce the social cost of reverse-payment settlement litigation by keeping more disputes out of court. Thus, courts will be freed
from the Morton's Fork of favoring either patent law or antitrust law, and
making a policy choice regardless. They will be free to do what courts
do best: apply the existing law to the facts of a particular case.
Furthermore, concentrating review in a single appellate court avoids
the uniformity problems that have plagued this area of law to date.
Pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers operate on a
global scale, and, for most of their operations in the United States, they
are regulated on the federal level. Given the nature of this industry, allowing different-and conflicting-law to govern different regional
circuits is not practical. By providing a single forum for appellate review
of the FTC's decisions, Congress will both foster predictability and facilitate the development of a body of law.243
It has also been suggested that the FTC could use the notification requirement to
240.
better understand reverse-payment settlement agreements. See Hemphill, supra note 21, at
671-73.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840-45
241.
(1984).
See supra Part Ill.B. .
242.
Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, a common criticism of the role of the
243.
regional circuits in the development of patent law was that each circuit applied divergent doctrines to similar disputes. This led to costly and inefficient forum shopping among patent
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D. An Efficient Solution

To better understand how this reform proposal might work, it is useful to examine precisely what decisions each institution might make.
While this Note does not advocate any of the following policy positions-its focus is strictly on how the process should work, not what the

outcome should be-the following proposal would allow each branch to
capitalize on its institutional strengths to achieve a more efficient regulatory outcome than the scattered court decisions and divergent policy
statements that define the legal and political landscape today.
To date, bills introduced in both houses of Congress have come
down in favor of more competition and against strong patent rights. Assuming that Congress wishes to strike that policy balance, it should do so
in a way that actually ensures a more competitive market rather than
simply paying lip service to economic efficiency. Beyond taking current
market conditions into account, this means that Congress should also
attempt to further the predictability and cost-reducing goals discussed
earlier in this Part.
First and foremost, such a statute should simply articulate a broad
principle-an end, not the legal means for achieving it. This approach is
not new to Congress, particularly in highly technical and rapidly evolving areas of the law. The heart of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
contains just ninety-six words, and the statutory backbone of securities
fraud actions, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 is
only slightly longer at 107 words. Yet, despite their lack of detail, these
two statutes account for a substantial portion of commercial litigation in
federal courts. Rather than embedding a particular period's prevailing
notions of "competition" and "the protection of investors" in the United
States Code, these statutes announce broad principles and direct agencies
that are more in touch with market standards and realities to effectuate
their goals. Some have even gone so far as to call the Sherman Act "the
Magna Carta of free enterprise," 245 emphasizing its status as an ideal
rather than a centralized, step-by-step plan for a capitalist economy.
Reverse-payment settlements constitute a legal problem that is similarly complex and dynamic. Given the large sums that are at stake in
plaintiffs, and it frustrated plaintiffs' goals of finality. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit-A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 513, 516 (1992). Similar trends are
emerging for reverse-payment settlement litigation. For instance, the defendants in FTC v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009), sought a change of
venue to Georgia to benefit from the llth Circuit's Schering-Plough standard. This emerging
inconsistency supports centralization.
244.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
245.
Hemphill, supra note 7, at 1555 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972)).
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ANDA litigation, pharmaceutical companies will certainly find ways
around any specific statutory provisions enacted to limit reversepayment settlements. Additionally, as in securities and antitrust litigation, today's understanding of the public good may not match
tomorrow's. While a detailed statute, such as one creating a presumption
of illegality, may effectuate our current understanding of how to create
more efficient pharmaceutical markets, it may not correspond with that
understanding when research and development costs change or when we
have a more complete data set that describes settlements that have been
signed to date. Because Congress cannot open statutes to revision as
quickly as market conditions or understandings change, it would be wise
to avoid legislating the regulatory details.
Thus, the substance of this proposed statute should include, at most,
Congress's desired ends and the framework upon which to build the
means. First, Congress might provide that a patent is not a defense to an
otherwise illegal market-sharing agreement. This provision would strike
a policy balance between patent and antitrust law, thus eliminating the
conflicting goals that have plagued courts so far. Furthermore, the statute
should create administrative safe harbors to further predictability. It
might provide that any settlement that complies with the rules and regulations that the FTC promulgates is presumptively legal,246 and it may
similarly provide the converse, establishing that any agreements that fall
outside of those safe harbors are presumptively illegal, subject to a ruleof-reason analysis by a court. Such a provision would allow pharmaceutical companies to structure their settlements against a clear legal
backdrop, thus avoiding the chilling effects created by today's chaotic
standards of review. Yet, to allow both legal and market innovation, Congress should ensure that the risk of litigation for agreements falling
outside of the FTC's safe harbors is not prohibitively high. It could accomplish this by eliminating any private rights of action to challenge
reverse-payment settlements, vesting enforcement power only in the
FTC. Under such a system, pro-competitive agreements that fall outside
of the safe harbors would be unlikely to result in substantial litigation
costs. This change would allow the FTC to be the sole judge of whether
reverse-payment settlements are contrary to the public interest, and it
would foster a dialogue between the FTC and industry to encourage effective regulation.247 Similarly, Congress should consolidate review of
The FTC's regulations would, of course, be subject to judicial review under the
246.
Administrative Procedures Act, and regulations that are inconsistent with the statute may be
invalidated.
Some may object to this provision, however, because a perceived goal of a safe
247.
harbor may be to provide penalties for stepping outside of the FTC's preapproved settlement
terms. Proponents of this view may counter that the FTC already engages in a dialogue with
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the FTC's decisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as discussed in the previous Section, to ensure
uniformity of review for agreements outside of the safe harbors.
Upon receiving this statutory authority, the FTC should use its industry knowledge to distinguish pro-competitive from anticompetitive
settlements, and it should implement its conclusions by crafting safe
harbors, just as the SEC currently does to implement the broad language
of the securities laws.248 Without delving too deeply into the economics
of reverse-payment settlements, it is possible to imagine several simple
types of safe harbors. The FTC may establish a settlement value cap,
allowing cash payments that are equal or less than the expected cost of
patent litigation, as determined by market data such as the American Intellectual Property Law Association's biennial Report of the Economic
Survey.249 Furthermore, it may allow in-kind payments, such as the overpayment and underpayment settlements described above,250 provided that
the sum of the cash plus the fair market value of any licenses or rights
transferred in the settlement are less than the settlement value cap. It
may further establish safe harbors for determining the fair market value
of such licenses and rights, such as requiring proof of an auction or affirmative management efforts to ensure a fair market price before
allowing the in-kind payment to fall within the safe harbor. 5 ' Finally, if
the FTC were to take a broader view of the patent holder's incentives to
industry through its rulemaking process, and that a private right of action is necessary to encourage industry to participate in the rulemaking process. Yet, this view rests on the
assumption that the optimal level of antitrust enforcement is the maximum possible level. This
may not be the case. First, agency enforcement is centralized and strategic, while litigation is
pluralistic and uncoordinated. The FTC may bring a case to emphasize a particular point,
while it may choose to ignore agreements that are outside a safe harbor yet arguably not anticompetitive. To allow such agreements to be challenged would chill legal and business innovation. Second, vesting enforcement authority in the FTC ensures that specialists, instead of
generalist judges, evaluate all agreements. This avoids the difficulties associated with courts
evaluating a pharmaceutical company's business plan, as discussed above. Finally, agency
enforcement has a bias toward negotiation-that is, a dialogue between the agency and all
industry participants-because an agency's enforcement priorities will affect decisions for all
market players. This supplements and guides the rulemaking process, and may provide a way
around impasses. Judicial enforcement, on the other hand, has a bias toward litigation and
settlement, as deals struck in one case do not bind other parties. A private right of action may
actually provide a way for industry participants to avoid the rulemaking process.
248.

See supra note 194.

See, e.g., AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE EcONOMIC SURVEY (2009).
249.
250.
See supra notes 75-78, 82 and accompanying text.
251.
Such a requirement to invoke the safe harbor may be analogous to the duty of a
corporation's directors under Delaware law to ensure maximum value for a company when a
sale or takeover is imminent. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). These auctions would be exclusively to value non-monetary components of a reverse-payment settlement. These valuations could then be used to determine if the
total compensation provided to the generic manufacturer constitutes fair market value.
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settle ANDA litigation, it may create a multiplier for the settlement value
cap to account for the reduced market risk-and the accompanying increase in stock price-which the settlement of ANDA litigation might
bring. While calculation of such a multiplier is beyond the scope of this
Note and likely beyond the capabilities of Congress, it is well within the
competence of an expert agency. Thus, the FTC may use its rulemaking
power to further promote predictability and reduce costs to the parties of
a settlement agreement, all the while ensuring that Congress's policy
goals are translated to real economic efficiency gains.
CONCLUSION
As the above survey of reverse-payment settlement cases demonstrates, the current law governing these agreements is, at best, confused.
With the FTC and DOJ advocating different positions, various circuit
courts applying related-yet-different tests, and Congress's failure to pass
a bill that regulates these agreements, patent holders and generic manufacturers simply must roll the dice in negotiating these deals. As pressure
for reform mounts-particularly from the Obama Administration's firm
stance on antitrust and the discussion of reverse-payment settlements
during the debates on the 2010 healthcare reform law-policymakers
will face a question of institutional choice. Who should determine the
legality of these agreements, and who should tell them how to do it?
This Note has undertaken a comparative analysis of all of the key
players. The various branches of our government are endowed with different powers, and, as scholars in the Hart-and-Sacks vein have so
passionately preached, allocating decision making to the appropriate institution is crucial to an efficient and legitimate system of government.
In the context of reverse-payment settlements, reform should begin with
Congress laying down broad policy goals and then delegating further
rulemaking authority to the FTC. The FTC may then use its unique
resources to study the market and promulgate safe harbors for procompetitive settlement agreements, and courts may fill in the blanks by
looking to the policies and regulations of these two bodies. By establishing a clear, predictable framework-and returning to common-sense
regulatory strategies that respect institutional competencies-this reform
will eliminate the chilling effects of uncertainty that now plague this area
of law.

